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SMALL SATELLITE MECHANICAL DESIGN EXPERIENCE
Stewart Meyers'
Special Payloads Divisionf740
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771

Abstract

Design drivers/requirements

The design approach used and the
experience gained in the building of four
small satellite payloads is explained.
Specific recommendations are made and the
lessons learned on the SAMPEX program
are detailed.
Background

The drivers for mechanical design are
a combination of the science requirements,
spacecraft subsystems, the launch vehicle
constraints and the physical realities of
space flight. The science requirements
determine the instrument component, the
attitude control system, the data system, the
power system, and the desired orbit.
The launch vehicle imposes weight and
volume constraints as well as launch loads
and operational requirements. The space
environment imposes a severe thermal and
radiation environment that is orbit dependent.
The instruments and other on board
components have structural and thermal
limits that must not be exceeded. There also
are special instrument requirements for field
of view and magnetic and optical cleanliness.

The Special Payloads Division,
formerly the Sounding Rocket Division. has
a long heritage of designing and building
scientific payloads for a variety of launch
vehicles. After years of building sounding
rocket. balloon. and high altitude aircraft
payloads, the division took on the design of
Spartan, Get Away Special, and Hitchhiker
payloads for the Space Shuttle.
After designing, building and flying
Pegsat, the first Pegasus payload, the
Special Payloads Division with help from
other Engineering Directorate Divisions was
chosen to build the SMail EXplorer (SMEX)
series spacecraft.
The first of these,
SAMPEX, was launched on a Scout rocket in
July 1992. The second,FAST, is undergoing
Engineering Test Unit (ETU) developmentfor
launch in Summer 94. The third, SWAS, is
scheduled to fly in Fall 95. Four more are
in a phase AlB study for launch in the 97-98
time frame.
The goal of the SMEX program is to produce
small, cheap, satellites in a short time frame.

Accommodating the desired science
requirements of these missions for launch on
a small launch vehicle has demanded
custom mechanical designs. So far each of
the four small satellites we have designed,
PEGSAT, SAMPEX, FAST, and SWAS have
had a unique structure and mechanical
subsystem.
Tight budgets and schedules as well as
minimal weight are design drivers.
It is important early on to pin down the
true design requirements.

Head Structures and Mechanical Systems Branchl741
Member AIAA

The lead engineer
Our approach to the design has been
to assign a lead mechanical engineer to the
project as soon as possible, and have him/or
her do the initial layouts to propose a
possible design and get the necessary inputs
and comments from the other leads. Giving
all the subsystem lead engineers authority as
well as responsibility allows them to operate
as a team and achieve the necessary
iterations to a final design. The design
process is necessarily a highly iterative one.
Peer reviews both formal and informal
should be frequently held to encourage
innovative thinking not just to make sure that
the design only uses existing ("flight proven N )
techniques.
The lead mechanical engineer is
responsible for his budget and scheduling as
well as the design, analysis, drawings,
fabrication, assembly and qualification of the
hardware. It is a lot of responsibility to
reside in one individual, but he/or she does
have branch support and the spacecraft are
small enough for this to be possible. This
placement of the responsibility in a few
individuals across the subsystems is what
makes it possible for the small satellite to be
-faster -better -cheaper
H

II

This is a people oriented team
approach. The subsystem leads operate
outside of their boxes on the "org chart. A
parallel systems engineering approach
develops among the subsystem leads that
complements the roll of the project systems
engineer in preventing items from falling
between the cracks of organization and
becoming real problems.
U

Keeping the team of lead engineers
intact from design through integration, test
and launch is vital.
Design considerations

The basic design principle is to
minimize the load path from the mass of the
spacecraft to the launch vehicle interface
while providing the instruments with the
required field of view, thermal enVironment,
and the other subsystems required.
Thermal
In a small satellite everything except
appendages tends to run at the same
temperature, which simplifies the
thermal/mechanical design.
However
thermal considerations are still a major
influence on the design and must not be an
afterthought. Blanketing, radiator panels,
and battery or experiment isolation are more
difficult than on a larger spacecraft.
Ground service equipment
Proper attention must be paid to
ground service eqUipment during design;
not as an afterthought.
Areas of concern are:
Turnover 'fixtures,
Test fixtures,
Lifting rigs,
Lifting points on the spacecraft,
Dollies,
Battery cooling,
Access to vital spots on spacecraft,
Shipping containers,
Clean room accommodation,
Mechanisms
If you must use mechanisms, make them
simple, reliable, and easy to test in one "g".
Don't make them overly complicated striving
It is very difficult to
for "redundancy".
increase the reliability of a mechanism by
making it more complicated. Allow for
thermal blankets on the structure as well as
the mechanism. Don't make heaters and
blankets an afterthought.
Don't make
connectors and wiring an afterthought either.
Go through a thorough test program.
Operate the mechanism in several
orientations to prove that gravity is not
helping too much and be wary of "g"
negation systems.
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Other design considerations
Allow for the cable harness that
connects the boxes and provide for its
mounting. Visualize it as at least a garden
hose. Before the advent of computer busses
as interfaces we used fire hose to mock up
a satellite harness.
Also allow for
connectors and the minimum bend radius of
the cable.
Analysis
After the initial design layout is made a
simple analysis is run, often by hand, to
check the initial assumptions on the primary
load path. Later on a simple finite element
model is made and the frequencies are
checked and structure is examined to reduce
weight and increase margins if necessary.
Eventually a complete model of the final
design will be made to run a coupled loads
analysis with the launch vehicle. Even this
model need not be too detailed. After all this
is supposed to be a finite not infinite element
analysis.
Fracture analysis is not necessary,
but is used on pieces that are not subject to
strength testing to comply with the structural
All subsystems
reliability requirements.
mechanical designs, including experiments
and electronics boxes, should be reviewed
by a mechanical engineer and have at least
cursory or "back of the envelope" stress
calculations. Finally everything should be
subject to thorough testing with plainly stated
goals and enough analysis to know what
levels are really being tested to.
Testing
Building a mechanical Engineering
Test Unit (ETU) has proven to be
essential to maintaining the tight
schedule that these small satellites are
built on.
The ETU is used to run mechanical fit
and interface verification checks. These fit

checks are run with the launch vehicle and
every other piece of hardware as early as
possible and every time there is the
possibility of a design change. A high fidelity
ETU frees the flight unit to continue
integration while these important checks are
It also allows lifting and other
made.
handling schemes to be worked out and
practiced without endangering the 1'Iight unit.
The ETU is also subject to thorough loads
and vibration testing and a modal survey to
qualify the structure. If there are
mechanisms, they are subject to these tests
and a thermal vacuum test as well as
deployment tests.
Testing is not limited to GSFC
facilities but is preformed at Wallops Is.
Langley or anywhere else that makes sense.
Documentation
The earlier that Interface Control
Documents and drawings can be agreed to,
the better. Less cost will accrue to program
and life will actually be made easier.
Having said that; minimize documentation to
what is actually needed. Lead engineers in
close contact can dramatically reduce the
formal paper flow while still maintaing the
communication necessary.
Control and minimize changes
Avoid requirement creep ... we often try
to go the extra mile for the experimenter and
incur the extra month, pound and dollar.
Avoid unnecessary changes but quickly
accommodate the necessary ones and pray
the project has the wisdom to differentiate
between them.
Conclusion
If a small satellite is going to be
"faster -better -cheaper" it is going to be, as
Dr. Len Fisk said on 1/25/89 ...
"A grown-up sounding rocket, not a scaled
down great observatory"

Specific SAMPEX lessons learned1
Interface verification
Fit check everything as early as
possible.
We fit checked most of the
SAMPEX components on the ETU structure
early in development. There were a few
problems but there was plenty of time to
correct them. There were a number of items
not checked due to the unavailability of the
components.
During flight unit integration the
majority of items that were not fit checked on
the ETU didn't fit properly. Some required
only quick Afite to fit" modifications but one
required complete redesign of an instrument
housing and significant rework of the
spacecraft structure with significant cost and
schedule impact.
All these items had ICD drawings.
The problem was that either the hardware
didn't match the drawings or that changes
made in one side of the interface were not
followed up and incorporated into the other
side.
GSE and test fixtures also need to be
fit checked. We had our mass properties
test fixture available several weeks before
the test. When we were ready to run the
test we discovered the fixture didn't fit on the
mass properties table. This was due to the
drawing being misread. If we would have fit
checked the fixture as soon as it was
available we could have discovered the
problem and fixed it long before we went to
test saving ourselves one more aggravating
delay.
LESSON LEARNED: People make honest
mistakes and ICD drawings aren't always
correct or complete. Fit checks are the only
way to verify the interface and the earlier
they are done· the easier it is to correct
problems.

Control and Minimize Changes
The HILT instrument was integrated
and then removed for some rework including
adding heaters and thermostats. When we
went to reinstall HILT it wouldn't fit properly.
The wire bundle for the heaters and
thermostats was causing an interference
problem which required rerouting of the
wiring.
In another incident, after we had
performed the vehicle heat-shield fit check
we added a small air conditioning tube to
cool the spacecraft battery on the launch
pad. When we went to install the heat-shield
there was interference with the air
conditioning tube and we had to cut it off on
the pad to allow heat-shield installation.
LESSON LEARNED: Don't change anything
after fit checks are completed. If a change
can't be avoided make sure the change is
communicated explicitly and incorporated
into the other affected interfaces. Then
recheck the interface.
Mechanical Design Lessons
SAMPEX Antenna Problem
The structure of the SAMPEX
antenna consisted of a fiberglass tube into
which a fiberglass plug was bonded to form
the base. In this plug was installed a helicoil insert by which a #10-32 screw was
used to attach the antenna to its mounting
bracket.
Both antennas were mounted to their
respective brackets with high strength (160
KSI) #10-32 screws and torqued to 55 in-Ibs.
This was the standard torque value we used
for this type screw. The spacecraft then
went through complete vibration and thermal
vacuum testing without incident (regarding
the antennas). The antennas were then
removed for component level checkouts.
Upon reinstallation of the antennas a
"pop" was heard during torquing of the upper
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antenna. The antenna was removed and a
crack was discovered running across the
base plug. The lower antenna was later
removed and it was found to be cracked
also.

3. Make sure the fibers carry the load when
using composite material especially when
machining fiberglass parts from stock
material. Make sure the fibers run in the
correct direction(s).

The root cause of the problem was
that there was no mechanical engineering
involvement in the detailed design of the
antenna. This led to the following specific
problems which in combination caused the
cracking:

4.
Specify flatness for critical mating
surfaces.

1. The torque of 55 in-Ib was not needed for
this specific application.
This torque
provided a pre-load of over 1000 Ibs. to hold
on antenna that weighed less than a quarter
of a pound.
2. 'The fibers in the base plug were
unidirectional. The high stress from the
screw pre-load was applied perpendicular to
the fibers. With no fibers to carry the load
the matrix simply cracked.
3. The mating surface was not flat. The
base plug was slightly recessed into the
antenna tube and there were small bumps
formed by the epoxy adhesive. These high
spots created a bending load on the base
plug when the screw was torqued.
To correct this problem we first
machined the base of the antennas flat, then
pressed fit the antennas into a aluminum
base cap. The pressed on base cap put the
base plug into compression preventing any
further cracking. We also reduced the screw
torque to 15 in-lb. These antennas were
requalified by component level vibration
testing.
LESSONS LEARNED:
1.
All mechanical designs should be
reviewed by a mechanical engineer and
have at least cursory or "back of the
envelope" stress calculations.

2. Use the appropriate screw torque for the
given application.

Tolerancing and Clearances
Don't make tolerances and
clearances tighter than needed. In a despin
test failure, an out of spec cable ball wedged
in its release slot where there was only .007
inch nominal clearance. There was no need
to have the clearance this tight and a small
variance caused a failure. In another case
we ran a battery air conditioning tube close
the edge of an 8 inch square opening in the
vehicle heat-shield. Due to normal variations
and tolerance buildup the tube ran too close
to the heat-shield and had to be cut off on
the pad. We could have run the tube 2
inches from the edge of the opening and had
plenty of margin for error.
Wire Harness Considerations
Allow adequate space for wiring
harness, de'fine routing concept early in
deSign stage. Allow space for mating and
securing connector fasteners, and for
harness strain relief.
Consider harness
tiedown methods.
Thermal Considerations
Define thermal limits for mechanisms
as early as possible. We had designed and
built our ETU solar array mechanism before
we had a firm worst case cold temperature.
This temperature turned out to be much
colder than we had anticipated. We had to
add heaters and numerous thermal isolators
to enable the mechanism to work at the cold
limit.
Review with the thermal engineer
early on the mounting of thermally sensitive
components such as batteries to provide
proper mounting and heat paths for these
components. Also review heater, thermostat

and thermistor locations to allow ample
space for them.
Blanketing
Allow ample time in the schedule for
thermal blanket fitting and installation. Allow
for blanket thickness in mechanical design
especially around mechanisms. Blankets
can be 1/4 inch thick or more. Don't make
blankets an afterthought.
Mechanical ETU Program
An ETU of the structure and
mechanical systems proved invaluable in the
development of SAMPEX. It allowed early fit
checks with ETU components where several
discrepancies were discovered and corrected
when there was still plenty of time in the
schedule.
The ETU allowed structural qualification and
model verification to be completed early.
Also vibration test response data from the
ETU was used for component level testing.
The ETU allows testing in parallel with the
flight unit development. We were able to run
solar array deployment and yo-yo despin
tests on the ETU without impacting the flight
schedule.
The ETU was great for showing people what
the spacecraft actually looked like, and
working out details of the flight unit design
such as for harness routing and thermal
blanket details.
The ETU allows performing tests that may
be too risky to be performed on flight
hardware.
For example during despin
testing a failed cable release caused the
cable and weight to wrap around the ETU.
This could have severely damaged the flight
spacecraft but was incidental to the ETU.
We also exercised all our lifting and turnover
equipment on the ETU before it was used on
the flight spacecraft.

Testing Lessons
Design mechanisms so that they can
function in a one "g" environment if pOSSible,
but take into account any deflections in the
one "g" that will not be present in zero "gil.
The SAMPEX solar arrays were designed to
operate in one "gil and this enabled easy
testing both ambient and in thermal vacuum.
Put ETU hardware through the
toughest testing.
The SAMPEX ETU
electronic boxes were only put through
random vibration. Flight boxes were put
through random, shock, and sine burst
vibration testing. We should have put the
ETU boxes through the tougher testing first
to uncover any potential problems. Then the
flight boxes could have been put through
less stringent acceptance level tests. The
same thing happened in EMI where ETU
boxes were not EMI tested at the component
level. The flight boxes were EMI tested
when in actuality it was too late to do
anything about problems that came up.
Spin Balance Lessons
We were able to balance the
spacecraft with a filled unbaffled fluid tank
with its centerline mounted on the spin axis,
but this made the process a lot slower.
Design in a place to mount balance
weights.
Ideally, the upper and lower
circular balance planes should be as far
apart as possible. Using a continuous circle
avoids having to split the weights to fit at
discreet points which requires greater total
weight to achieve balance and takes more
iterations.
Design weights so that small amounts
can be added or removed without disturbing
the entire weight. We had weight stacks
which had to be completely removed to
adjust the weight. The slight misalignment
from removing and reinstalling the weight
stacks was enough to disturb the balance.
Stick on weights for the final trimming would
be a good idea.
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Bring raw material to make weights to
spin balance. We brought precut plates that
we intended to stack to attain the proper
weight. In one case we needed more weight
than anticipated and had to rig up a huge,
ugly, bolted together weight stack. If we had
had material to cut new weights we could
have done a faster, more structurally sound
and aesthetic job.
Balance is very sensitive; ounces,
even grams of mass added or removed can
throw the balance out of spec. For this
reason spin balance should be performed as
late as possible in the schedule to minimize
the potential for changes which could affect
the balance.
Oespin Testing
A yo-yo despin system will not despin
to the predicted final spin rate if tested in air.
If the final spin rate is critical, the system
must be tested in vacuum. We tested our
system in air and were unable to attain our
target spin rate of 0 ± 3 rpm. In vacuum we
easily met this goal. Although the tests in air
did prove valuable in testing the function of
the mechanism where some problems were
uncovered.

Management/Operational Lessons
Provide contingency time in schedule.
We had virtually no contingency in the
schedule during SAMPEX 1&T. This meant
that any small glitch or delay threw the entire
schedule into disarray and made it very
difficult for people to plan work especially on
nights and weekends.
This was very
aggravating for people who were already on
the verge of burnout. Problems and delays
are to be expected and contingency should
be provided in the schedule to reduce the
continuous reshuffling of the schedule.
Most operational problems were
caused by lack of communication and lack of
clearly defined responsibilities for tasks not
clearly under a specific subsystem. We had
some of our most aggravating days
performing what seemed like simple tasks.
For example to ship the spacecraft to
building 7 and get it set up in the thermal
vacuum chamber was fraught with problems.
The truck driver was told the wrong time to
be there, no one in building 7 is expecting
us, there is no crane operator ready, no
lifting procedure, no one knows what clean
room suits to wear, etc. etc.

Miscellaneous Lessons
Provide two sets of GSE such as
lifting slings and dollies, if the cost is not
prohibitive. This way one is available to use
while the other is out being proof tested and
inspected or is with the ETU for off site
testing.
Pyro actuators are long lead items.
Order them early and get plenty of spares for
functional testing. On our ETU we ran one
ambient and four thermal vacuum solar array
deployments, and five yo-yo despin
deployments. We also ran two solar array
deployments in thermal vacuum on the flight
spacecraft. That's a total of twelve pyro
activated test deployments and more pyros
than that fired.

Find problems early. Problems found
early are easy to fix. Problems found late in
the game cause many late nights and gray
hairs. Do whatever is possible to uncover
problems early. Fit check everything, even
if only a box enclosure is available. Test
ETU hardware rigorously.
Do tasks in parallel as much as
possible. This is why ETU hardware is so
valuable. It allows testing off line without
affecting the flight spacecraft flow, saving
valuable time. When you rush you make
mistakes. When we were performing our
last thermal vacuum test of the solar array
we rushed to get the ETU ready for test and
forgot to include some thermal isolators.

This caused the test to fail. Luckily this
was on the ETU and did not affect the flight
spacecraft schedule, but we did have to work
another weekend to fix the problem and pay
for additional time in the thermal vacuum
chamber. All because we were in too big of
a hurry.
Travel
Travel pays for itself. We traveled to
Max Plank Institute in Munich Germany three
times to discuss the HILT instrument design
and work out interface details. Although
these trips were highly enjoyable, each trip
uncovered significant problems that we were
able to resolve early on. It is doubtful these
problems would have been uncovered until
the instrument was delivered for integration
had we not traveled to Germany, talked with
the engineers and seen the actual hardware.

On the other hand, we (mechanical
group) never traveled to the west coast or
saw the MAST/PET instrument until it was
delivered for integration. The instrument was
to be assembled from parts on the shelf to
old specifications which were supposedly
well defined. The actual instrument, when it
arrived, violated its ICD and would not fit in
the spacecraft structure.
The structural
integrity of the instrument enclosure was also
questionable. To make a long story short it
cost us $17,000 to modify the spacecraft
structure and redesign and rebuild the
instrument enclosure. Add to that several
weeks of civil service manpower, Swales
analysis and the cost of vibration testing of
the instrument and we could have paid for
more than a few trips to the west coast.

The same was true with the LEICA
instrument which was developed at the
University of Maryland. Since Maryland is
within easy driving distance we were able to
work closely with LEICA engineers to resolve
all problems.

1. SAMPEX Lessons Learned: Mechanical Subsystem
James W. Kellogg, Lead Mechanical Engineer SAMPEX
Section Head Code 741.1, GSFC
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